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Abstract
Recently K-anonymity has gained popularity as a pri-
vacy quantification against linking attacks, in which attack-
ers try to identify a record with values of some identify-
ing attributes. If attacks succeed, the identity of the record
will be revealed and potential confidential information con-
tained in other attributes of the record will be disclosed. K-
anonymity counters this attack by requiring that each record
must be indistinguishable from at least K − 1 other records
with respect to the identifying attributes.
Randomization can also be used for protection against
linking attacks. In this paper, we compare the performance
of K-anonymization and randomization schemes under link-
ing attacks. We present a new privacy definition that can
be applied to both k-anonymization and randomization. We
compare these two schemes in terms of both utility and risks
of privacy disclosure, and we promote to use R-U confiden-
tiality map for such comparisons. We also compare various
randomization schemes.
1 Introduction
With the advance of information technologies, the
amount of information collected by different entities is in-
creasing exponentially. These data, if available to the gen-
eral public, can significantly benefit the society. However,
many databases contain people’s confidential information,
which, as required by law, cannot be disclosed. Some nec-
essary transformations have to be performed on a database
before its publication, but such transformation is non-trivial.
One of the greatest threats faced by database publication is
linking attacks. In this type of attack, adversaries who have
already known partial information (through other means)
about a person try to identify the record that belong to this
∗This work was supported by Grant ISS-0219560, ISS-0312366 and
CNS-0430252 from the United States National Science Foundation.
person; if adversaries can successfully identify the record,
all the information (including confidential information) of
that record will be disclosed.
K-anonymity is a popular way of specifying privacy re-
quirements over a to-be-published database which might be
subject to external linking attacks. This privacy requirement
is conceptually simple - it only imposes one restriction: a
database is k-anonymized if, for each existing combination
of identifying attributes, there are at least K records that
contain such a combination. Attackers are thus forced to
accept this coarse granularity of K records.
The most straightforward way to achieve K-anonymity
is to group some records with similar identifying attributes’
values together and merge these values to one “new” value
which is a set containing all original values merged. This
technique is called the generalization approach due to the
fact that some attributes’ values of certain records are gen-
eralized to a coarser, or a more general value.
Another way to achieve data privacy in a published
database is to introduce extra noise to a database by either
adding random noises or mixing different values together.
An advantage of this randomization approach is that this
process is partially reversible, i.e., these added noises can be
partially removed so that some aggregate information can
be recovered from the disguised database while the precise
reconstruction of individual record is still impossible.
The possibility of reconstruction of original data distri-
bution from disguised database makes randomization more
attractive than pure generalization where multiple values are
mapped to a same fake label and this label can only provide
a uniform guess of original value. Thus we propose to apply
randomization technique to prevent linking attacks, which
might yield a disguised database with a higher data utility
than generalization.
Contributions We propose a new privacy definition that
can be applied to many data disguising techniques, includ-
ing K-anonymization and randomization. We also pro-
mote to use the R-U confidentiality map to compare K-
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anonymization and randomization. Extensive simulations
are also carried out to reach a conclusion.
2 Background
2.1 K-Anonymity
K-anonymity was formulated by Samarati and
Sweeney [7] to protect a public database from linking
attacks. It is a popular way of specifying privacy re-
quirements over a to-be-published database which might
be subject to external linking attacks. This privacy re-
quirement is conceptually simple - it only imposes one
restriction: a database is k-anonymized if for each existing
combination of identifying attributes, there are at least K
records that contain such a combination. Attackers are thus
forced to accept this coarse granularity of K records.
All identifying attributes values that are generalized into
the same macro-value form a set, and this set is character-
ized by the following concept of equivalence class.
Definition 2.1 (Equivalence Class) An equivalence class
is a set Ec of combinations of identifying attributes values
that satisfy the following two conditions:
1. ∀x ∈ Ec,∀y ∈ Ec, the probability of transforming x
to s is not zero.
2. ∀y /∈ Ec, the set {y} ∪ Ec does not satisfy the above
condition.
Some algorithms have been proposed to K-anonymity
problem [5]. In our paper, we will apply the Incognito algo-
rithm by LeFevre et al [5]. In Incognito algorithm, a com-
plete search is done to find the least generalization schemes
given a generalization hierarchy.
2.2 Randomization
The Randomized Response (RR) technique was pro-
posed by Warner [8] in the statistics community in 1965
as a technique to solve the following survey problem: to
estimate the percentage of people in a population that has
attribute A. Warner developed a randomized response tech-
nique to prevent the interviewer from learning the actual
answers from the clients, while allowing the interviewer to
compute the aggregate result, i.e., the percentage of clients
that has attribute A. Warner’s methods focus on binary case
and can be extended to categorical attributes.
The randomization approach for privacy preserving data
mining was first reintroduced by Agrawal and Srikant pro-
posed in [1]. To randomize categorical data, Rizvi and Har-
itsa presented a scheme to mine associations with secrecy
constraints in [6]; Evfimievski et al. proposed an approach
to conduct privacy preserving association rule mining [3];
Du and Zhan proposed an approach to conduct privacy pre-
serving decision tree building [2]. Zhu and Liu proposed
a general framework for randomization based on mixture
models [9].
3 Quantifying Privacy for Linking Attacks
Given a published database, the goal of linking attacks is
to find out the value t, the index of a record, given values
of identifier attributes, so that they can link the identity IDt
with the t-th record. Generally speaking, the effectiveness
of linking attacks depends on the probability of discover-
ing the correct index t of the target record. The damage of
linking attacks is alleviated to some degree when this prob-
ability is bounded by some number less than 1.
We use an oracle model in the quantification of privacy,
i.e., we assume that the original database is totally known
in calculation, but not to attackers. This corresponds to the
case when the database owner evaluates the privacy breach
of the published database.
Some notations need to be clarified before we proceed.
Let N be the number of records in the database. Let Rt
be the values of identifiers of the t-th record. Assume that
attackers have known the values Rt of the t-th record. Also,
we only focus on identifying attributes.
Our quantification will be presented in a series of defi-
nitions and theorems, and many proofs will be omitted due
to page limitations. Please see our website for the complete
version with proofs and intuitive explanations.
Definition 3.1 The success of linking attacks for the t-th
record with identifiers values Rt is defined to be the follow-
ing probability
Pr(t | Rt) = Pr(Find t successfully given Rt).
Definition 3.2 Let Pr(A → B) denote the probability of
reconstructing values of identifier attributes as B from the
disguised data, given that the original values are A.
Pr(A → B) implies how much information is preserved
after the disguising transformation of the original database
and it is similar to the probability defined in binary attribute
case [6].
In the reconstructing process, only the records whose
identifiers’ values are in the equivalence class which A
belongs to should be considered. Assume the size of
this equivalence class is m, and denote its elements as
C1, C2, · · · , Cm. Also, denote the original and disguised
values of identifiers as X and Y respectively.
Lemma 3.1 The probability Pr(A → B) can be computed
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as follows:
Pr(A → B) =
m∑
j=1
P (Y = Cj | X = A) P (X = B | Y = Cj).
Lemma 3.2 The probability that a disguised identifiers
value is C is
P (Y = C) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
P (Y = C | X = Ri).
where Ri is the identifiers value of the i-th record.
Definition 3.3 The probability of the success of linking at-
tacks can be computed as follows:
Pr(t | Rt) = Pr(Rt → Rt)
NP (X = Rt)
.
Linking attacks involve two steps. First, attackers need
to make sure the values of identifier attributes of the re-
identified record are correct; second, if there are multiple
records in the original database with these values, attackers
need again to choose one from this many records. The de-
nominator and the nominator of the above equation reflect
these two steps.
Theorem 3.1 The probability of successful identification of
the record t is
Pr(Rt → Rt) =
m∑
j=1
P 2(Y = Cj | X = Rt)P (X = Rt)∑N
i=1 P (Y = Cj | X = Ri) · 1N
,
where {C1, C2, · · · , Cm} is the set of equivalence class that
identifier values Rt belongs to.
Theorem 3.2
Pr(t | Rt) =
m∑
j=1
P 2(Y = Cj | X = Rt)∑N
i=1 P (Y = Cj | X = Ri)
.
Proof. By definition 3.3 and theorem 3.1.
Armed with this probability of identifying original
records, we are ready to define privacy against linking at-
tacks. In particular, we are interested in the following two
definitions.
Definition 3.4 The Bound Privacy against linking attacks
is defined to be
Bound Privacy = 1 − Nmax
t=1
Pr(t | Rt).
Definition 3.5 The Top q-percentile Privacy against link-
ing attacks is defined to be
Top q-percentile Privacy = 1 − 1
N ′
N ′∑
i=1
Pr(i | Ti).
where in the second term we compute the average of the
q-percent largest values of Pr(i|Ti), and N ′ = Nq/100.
{T1, T2, · · · , TN} is the set of sorted records in decreasing
order of Pr(i|Ti).
Definition 3.6 (Risk) The risk against linking attacks is de-
fined to be
Risk = 1 − Privacy.
Accordingly, we have Bound Risks and top q-percentile
risks. These two risk definitions characterize different as-
pects of linking attacks. The Bound Risk is concerned with
the worst case where the identifying probability of a certain
record is the largest among all records. On the other hand,
the top q-percentile privacy is concerned with the average
case of the q-percent largest values.
The above defined privacy and risk for linking attacks is
very general, and thus can be applied to any data disguis-
ing technique which transforms the original database to the
disguised database.
We can easily show that the bound risk in K-
Anonymized dataset is 1/K, which means that the privacy
definition of the K-Anonymity fits into our framework of
privacy analysis, and it is a special case of our Bound Pri-
vacy. Furthermore, we have one more privacy - top q-
percentile privacy, which is not considered in K-Anonymity,
to capture the average case of the privacy breach.
Randomization schemes also fit into this privacy analysis
naturally due to the data disguising method used. In a ran-
domization scheme, each categorical value is retained with
certain probability and is transformed to one of the other
categorical values in the same equivalence class with some
probabilities. These probabilities are utilized in the com-
putation of the Bound Privacy and the Top q-percentile Pri-
vacy.
4 R-U Confidentiality Map
There are good and bad sides of the published database,
for example, utility for data mining, and disclosure risk due
to possible linking attacks. The ultimate goal of data dis-
guising is to maximize utility and minimize risk of privacy
disclosure at the same time.
Obviously, this ultimate goal is not feasible in reality,
thus the trade-off between these two conflicting ends need
to be made. Likewise, these two aspects need to be con-
sidered in any comparison between any two data disguising
schemes as countermeasures against linking attacks.
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While it is easy to compare either utility or risk of two
different data disguising schemes, any such comparisons
are incomplete if done separately. Instead, we need to con-
sider these two aspects at the same time. Specifically, we
should only compare the privacy of different schemes when
both schemes have exactly the same utility, and we should
only compare the utilities of different schemes when both
schemes have exactly the same privacy.
However, it is very difficult for two different schemes
to yield exactly the same utility or privacy in comparisons,
because precise control of either utility or privacy in a data
disguising scheme is almost impossible. This requires the
generation of a curve describing relationships between risk
and utility for each data disguising scheme, and we should
compare such curves of different schemes.
A theoretical relationship between risk and utility is
highly desired but very difficult to obtain due to the com-
plexity of whole data disguising and utilization process. In-
stead, we can quantify this relationships in an empirical
curve by simulations. This curve is named empirical R-U
confidentiality map (abbreviated as R-U map), proposed by
Duncan et al [4].
Each such empirical curve depicts the characteristics of
the data disguising technique in terms of relations between
the privacy disclosure risk under linking attacks and the util-
ity in various data mining processes. It not only makes the
trade-off between these two conflicting aspects prominent,
but also enables us to compare performance of two data dis-
guising schemes in an easy and complete way.
Therefore, we will mainly use this R-U Confidential-
ity map as a metric in comparing different data disguising
schemes, and we will draw conclusions from these curves.
Utility
In most, if not all, data mining processes, the most im-
portant information is the probability distribution of the
data, which motivates us to focus on the data distribution
when evaluating the utility of a database. Therefore, the
Kullback-Leibler Distance (KL-Distance), or relative en-
tropy, which is commonly used as a measure of difference
between two probability distributions in information theory,
is used as the metric of the utility of the disguised database
in this paper.
Specifically, for a disguised database, we compute the
KL-distance between it and the original. The larger
the KL-distance value, the bigger the difference between
two databases, and the worse the utility of the disguised
database.
5 Methodology
Our strategy is to compare different data disguising tech-
niques using R-U Maps. Specifically, we fill first compare
randomization and generalization schemes, and then com-
pare different randomization schemes.
5.1 Comparisons of Randomization and
K-Anonymity Schemes
We may compare randomization and K-Anonymity
schemes with any equivalence class definitions. To make
comparisons more fair to K-Anonymity, we will run a K-
Anonymity algorithm, and the resulting solutions, which
are the best cases for K-Anonymity requirement, are used
to generate R-U maps. We will use a complete search algo-
rithm that does not use any approximations, i.e., Incognito
algorithm proposed by LeFevre et al [5].
Our intuition is that, unlike in the database disguised via
generalization methods, in the disguised database via ran-
domization, we can partially recover original data distribu-
tion, which improves the utility of the disguised database.
Therefore, we believe that R-U maps will show that ran-
domization methods will generally outperform generaliza-
tion method.
5.2 Comparisons of Different Randomiza-
tion Schemes
Many different randomization schemes exist that ran-
domize the original database in different ways, calling for
the method to choose the best one that is most suitable for a
specific application context.
The equivalence class setup reflects the way the original
domains of all attributes are reorganized and randomized.
Consequently, the equivalence class definition is inherent
in a randomization process and thus we use it as an es-
sential parameter when comparing different randomization
schemes.
To make comparisons more fair, we enforce another
rule - the equivalence classes in different randomization
schemes should form a total order relationship, with the or-
der being defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 We say the equivalence classes in two ran-
domization schemes, denoted as R1, R2, form a less than
order relationship, R1 ⊆ R2 if and only if we can obtain R1
by dividing some equivalence classes R2 into more equiva-
lence classes.
Note that we have defined privacy in two different ways,
and they are bound privacy and top q-percentile privacy. For
q-percentile privacy, we will choose q values to be 5 and
100. By letting q be 5 we focus on the privacy of a few
records with the worst privacy breaches, which may help us
better understand and explain bound privacy results. With q
being 100 we are computing the average of all records.
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Figure 1. Comparison between Randomization and K-Anonymization
Our intuition for the comparison is that under the con-
straint of the total order relationship, the randomization
scheme with a smaller number of equivalence classes will
better preserve privacy when utilities are the same.
6 Evaluation
We use the adult database from UCI data mining repos-
itory in our evaluations. There are 14 attributes in adult
database, and we used 5 of them as identifying attributes.
6.1 Comparisons between K-
Anonymization and Randomization
To generate R-U maps for K-Anonymity, we apply
Incognito algorithm to adult database, with K being 1, 2,
3, and 4. The R-U Maps of K-Anonymity and randomiza-
tion schemes are shown in figures 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c).
As shown in the figures, the KL-distances of general-
ized databases are much bigger than those of randomized
databases when K > 1. Note that there is a big gap between
bound risks 1 and 0.5 because K can only take integer val-
ues.
From these figures, we can clearly see that randomiza-
tion outperforms generalization used in K-Anonymity. It is
mainly due to the fact that we can partially recover the orig-
inal data distribution in the randomization scheme, whereas
data distribution within each equivalence class is totally lost
in generalization.
6.2 Comparisons of different Randomiza-
tion schemes
To compare different randomization schemes, we gener-
ate a R-U map for each randomization scheme. As stated in
section 5, we use the number of equivalence classes as the
characteristic parameter of each R-U map, specifically, we
choose the numbers to be 5, 8, and 11. We also draw R-U
maps for three privacy definitions, i.e., Bound privacy, top
5-percentile privacy, and top 100-percentile privacy.
Figure 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) show the R-U Map of Adult
database, with different privacy definitions. From these fig-
ures, we can see clearly the conflicting trend of risk and
utility. Obviously and naturally, there is a trade-off be-
tween minimizing risk and maximizing utility (in our fig-
ures, the smaller the KL-distance, the better the utility.) The
risk is decreasing approximately linearly with the decreas-
ing of the KL-distance of the disguised database. At the
beginning, when the distortion of the original database is
little, the utility of the disguised database is very high (KL-
distance is zero), and the risk is also very high. With the
decreasing of the utility of the disguised database, the speed
of decreasing of risk slows down.
The smaller the total number of equivalence classes, the
better the R-U map. By better we mean that with any given
required utility, we may choose a parameter setup in the bet-
ter randomization scheme that yields a less privacy breach.
For each total number of equivalence classes, the top 5-
percentile risk is slightly smaller than the bound risk, which
indicates that the worst case privacy is not a singular point,
instead, there are some risks close to it.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we define a new privacy in the case of link-
ing attacks, which makes it possible for us to compare K-
Anonymity and randomization schemes in the same frame-
work.
We promote to use the Risk-Utility Map to compare the
effectiveness of different data disguising techniques. The
curves in Risk-Utility Map clearly show the relations be-
tween disclosure risk and utility of the published database in
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Figure 2. Comparison of various Randomization Schemes
the disguised form. The R-U maps shown in the evaluations
clearly indicate the relative performances of the two data
disguising schemes. In practical situations, these curves
may help us decide which data disguising technique to use.
Generally speaking, randomization schemes outperform
generalization in terms of achieving better privacy pro-
tection while yielding the same utility of the disguised
database. As a result, we prefer randomization over gen-
eralization used in K-anonymity. However, generalization
schemes do not require the modification of user’s appli-
cation software, since the disguised database contains the
most accurate information given the way it is generated. On
the other hand, randomization schemes require the modi-
fication of user’s application software, of course, with the
benefits of better estimated data distribution.
In randomization schemes, we prefer to use more equiv-
alence classes in terms of maximizing data utility and min-
imizing privacy breaches. The extreme case of this is to
let all domains of all attributes form a single equivalence
class, as shown in the case of 5 equivalence class in evalua-
tion section. However, the less the equivalence classes, the
more the computation time. By forming only one equiva-
lence class, the reconstructing of the original data distribu-
tion in the data mining or other data applications will take
much longer time, slowing down the practical software.
In the practical applications of these techniques, whether
randomization or generalization is the most appropriate data
disguising technique depends on the context of the applica-
tion. A trade-off must be made between privacy protection
and data utility according to R-U maps.
In the future, we will evaluate generalization and ran-
domization schemes in more details, for example, different
ways to define equivalence classes. We will also apply the
methodology to other data disguising techniques.
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